Abstract
Introduction
Rulings of international human rights bodies (IHRBs 1 ) have had a tremendous impact on national legal systems.
compliance, for instance, have been labelled as 'a remarkably stable and common outcome'. 10 At the same time, many cases of narrow reading and minimalist compliance with international human rights decisions have been reported by various scholars.
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Delayed compliance is yet another problem as it brings about new human rights violations of a similar kind and repetitive applications lodged at the IHRBs, which is undesirable from the point of view of both human rights protection and the effectiveness of these human rights regimes. 12 We call this phenomenon 'compliance difficulties', which, in our understanding, include cases where the international ruling did not cause the intended effects and did not bring about the respective change as well as cases where it took unduly long to change the status quo. Compliance difficulties thus encompass instances of noncompliance, partial compliance and substantial compliance delays. 13 It is crucial to understand the logic underlying the emergence of these compliance difficulties. Even though generating compliance is not the only task of IHRBs, it remains one of the central measures of their effective functioning.
14 Compliance difficulties imply that the issue addressed by the international decision has not been fully redressed, which increases the risk of future human rights violations of a similar nature. At the same time, compliance difficulties can have troublesome effects for the international body's social legitimacy and its backlog.
The aim of this article is to explore factors that account for compliance difficulties. In order to do so, we treat compliance as a process and study compliance difficulties through an in-depth intra-country comparison. 15 More specifically, we analyse three high-cost rulings of IHRBs against the Czech Republic. 16 By doing so, we make the following contributions to the existing literature on compliance with international human rights rulings. First, we offer a contribution as to the implementation 10 Hawkins and Jacoby, ' 16 For justification of this case selection, see Section 3 of this article.
of international human rights rulings based on the in-depth analysis of an original and extensive range of documents in an understudied jurisdiction. Second, we identify factors that account for the variable level of implementation in a well-complying new democracy and show how they interact together.
More specifically, our study shows that the level of compliance achieved depends on a repeated balancing exercise, in which domestic political actors balance domestic political costs of compliance against international reputational costs of non-compliance. The higher the domestic political costs and the lower the international reputational costs are, the more likely compliance difficulties will occur. On the contrary, cases distinguished by low domestic political costs and high international reputational costs tend to lead to full and timely compliance, at least in the conditions of a liberal democracy with developed institutional capacities. Importantly, these costs can change over time, and, thus, the result of the balancing exercise may in the later phases of compliance processes change as well. Hence, a lapse of time is critical in understanding the compliance processes as sometimes even a short moment of time, when domestic political costs of compliance become lower than international reputational costs of non-compliance, may create a 'window of opportunity' for adopting legislation that is necessary for implementing IHRBs' rulings.
This article proceeds in the following way. Section 2 sets out the state of the art of scholarship on IHRBs and domestic policy change. Section 3 provides justification why the Czech Republic was selected. Section 4 includes a qualitative intra-country comparison of the compliance processes in the Czech Republic. Section 5 theorizes about compliance difficulties more broadly, and Section 6 concludes.
IHRBs and Domestic Policy Change: The State of the Art
International courts and tribunals, including the human rights ones, have undergone a significant transformation in recent decades. Generally, they have shifted towards predominantly compulsory jurisdiction 17 and gained a higher degree of independence from the nation-states' control, wider access and further domestic embeddedness. 18 Besides the traditional role of dispute settlement, international courts have also acquired the functions of enforcement, administrative review and constitutional review. 19 As a result of the international courts' proliferation and strengthening, 20 some even talk about a paradigm change in their creation and use. At the same time, the number of quasi-judicial bodies charged with individual human rights complaints has also increased. 22 Such bodies resemble international human rights courts in their function as they determine whether a state party has violated its human rights commitments under the respective treaty and, thereby, engage with internal policies and activities of the state. Unlike the rulings of international courts, quasi-judicial bodies' decisions are not strictly legally binding. 23 Nevertheless, they do have significant normative effects 24 and produce domestic change, at least in liberal democracies. For instance, the HRC's views were labelled as 'strong indicators of legal obligations' and the 'authoritative determination' of the content of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which should be ascribed 'great weight'. 25 Therefore, we speak about compliance even with regard to the HRC's views, even though some doctrinal scholars would say that there is no legal obligation to comply with these views. Still, views are pronouncements of 'behavioural obligations to which some expectation of compliance is attached'. 26 The expectation of compliance can be demonstrated by the HRC's developing practice of formulating remedies, 27 establishing follow-up procedures, 28 categorizing and monitoring the states parties' replies 29 and the HRC's own efforts to increase the authority of its views. 30 However, despite their strengthening and autonomization, international courts (and, still less, quasi-judicial bodies) have no influence over 'either the sword or the purse'. 31 IHRBs are empowered to interpret the law in their rulings, but, on their own, they lack effective formal instruments to enforce them. 32 How then can we explain compliance with international bodies' rulings and the resulting policy changes? The vast literature has tried to address this question, and many theoretical strands have 22 emerged. 33 Since we aim specifically to uncover factors contributing to the difficulties emerging when complying with IHRBs' rulings, we believe that the theories of compliance that focus on domestic politics and political mobilization provide the best answer. 34 This is so because, despite the aforementioned proliferation of international (human rights) judiciary, national institutions have retained the instruments of coercion and enforcement. 35 Approaches drawing upon domestic politics are then well situated to adequately explain the compliance processes with the rulings of the IHRBs.
Since the IHRBs are not able to enforce their rulings themselves, the domestic institutions may remedy this lack of enforcement capacity. 36 The international ruling thus may lead to domestic policy change through the medium of domestic politics. 37 As Courtney Hillebrecht puts it with regard to the Strasbourg Court: '[D]omestic actors hold the key to the Court's ability to affect human rights on the domestic level.' 38 Similarly, Martin Scheinin emphasizes the importance of domestic political backing with respect to the implementation of the UN treaty bodies' decisions. 39 Several studies have shown that domestic policy responses to rulings of IHRBs do not take place automatically. While international human rights rulings can operate as 'tipping points' 40 or 'tool[s] to support political mobilization', 41 domestic responses depend instead on the ability and willingness of domestic actors to push through such a change. Some authors, therefore, notice that the theories that treat the state as a monolithic block tend to overlook domestic political dynamics that are crucial for compliance, and they argue for the opening of the black box of the state. 42 Within the state, various scholars have focused on the role of different institutions, some dealing with the potential of civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 43 and pressure groups, 44 while others consider the power of the judiciary, 45 legislature 46 or the executive 47 to push through policy changes.
Still, the processes of compliance are multi-faceted. Hence, recent scholarship suggests that domestic pro-compliance coalitions are crucial for compliance, and its degree, 48 because '[n]o single domestic actor, not even the strongest executive, can satisfy all of the tribunals' mandates, legally or logistically. Changing the country's law and policies, developing new programs, and striking down existing legislation require a coalition of domestic actors willing and able to comply with the tribunals' rulings'. 49 These domestic institutional mechanisms are complex and comprise a number of actors with diverse capacities, interests and attitudes towards human rights in general. According to Sonia Cardenas, the domestic battle over compliance may be affected more by the distribution of institutional power than by the greatest commitment to international human rights law. 50 Hillebrecht complements this consideration, stating that '[i]nternational law, and particularly the tribunals' rulings, can provide an impetus for action for individual actors or coalitions of actors, but their ability to act on that impetus will be limited -or enhanced -by their domestic political power'. 51 Therefore, in order to understand the logic and politics of compliance in a particular country, it is necessary to examine domestic mechanisms of compliance in a complex and thorough way. Only then can we decipher the factors that account for compliance difficulties. However, it is also important to keep in mind that the constructivist domestic politics theories discussed above often operate in tandem with rational mechanisms. 52 Domestic policy change is also dependent on the international reputational costs for a non-complying state, 53 and, thus, domestic actors can use international human rights rulings as an 'additional weapon for shaming' in order to increase the pressure on policy-makers to engage in a cost-benefit analysis. 54 Nevertheless, third states usually have little incentive to push openly for enforcement human rights obligations in the non-complying states since it is costly and rarely brings direct benefits for an enforcing state. 55 To summarize, the IHRBs pronounce on what the law is and judge whether the state's behaviour conforms to the rule or not. Thereby, these bodies provide incentives for domestic policy change and make potential non-compliance more costly. However, the actual decision whether and how to comply rests primarily on the domestic political actors and on the dynamics of their mutual positions and relations.
Why the Czech Republic?
The theoretical starting point of our inquiry is that the outcome of implementation of an IHRB's ruling is dependent primarily upon domestic politics, especially on the alliance of an IHRB with the domestic actors. 56 Yet, regarding the concept of compliance difficulties, we believe the existing theories are not sufficiently detailed to explain what specific factors contribute to compliance difficulties and how. In order to address this gap and probe the factors that contribute to the emergence of compliance difficulties and account for the variable level of implementation of high-cost rulings of IHRBs, we conducted an intra-country comparison of the internal dynamics of compliance processes. Concentration on a single country was apt for our research aim as it allowed us to go into substantial depth in the domestic dynamics of implementation of the IHRBs' rulings. In addition, intra-country comparisons hold many of the eventually intervening factors constant. At the same time, however, concentration on a single country limited the applicability of our conclusions. Nevertheless, our findings should also be applicable in other liberal democracies with sufficient legal infrastructure and domestic institutional capacity 57 and with reasonable governmental alteration.
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We chose the Czech Republic since it is the most likely case for the implementation of IHRBs' rulings within the Central and Eastern European region. It is the most stable liberal democracy in the region and also one of the 'best compliers' among the new European democracies, 59 and, at the same time, it displays few instances of prolonged compliance processes or even straightforward non-compliance. Such a constellation 55 This is due to the very nature of international human rights law, which, unlike other areas of international law such as trade or security, has effects almost entirely domestic and lacks the element of reciprocity. The logic of selection of the three particular cases studied in section 4 is as follows. We concentrated on rulings that touched upon the structural problems of the national legal system and required legislative amendments (for the sake of brevity, we refer to them as 'high-cost rulings') rather than on rulings that pointed out violations in individual exceptional cases. First, we selected the two most striking cases of compliance difficulties with IHRBs' rulings in the Czech Republic: (i) a case of non-compliance, which involved the HRC's views on the Czech restitution laws and the requirement of Czech citizenship for a successful restitution claim in Adam v. Czech Republic 60 and (ii) a case of a delayed compliance process involving the ECtHR's 2007 Grand Chamber judgment in D.H. v. Czech Republic, which concerned the segregation of Roma children in primary education and has not been fully implemented even after a decade-long process. 61 We chose these two outlier cases, which deviated from the ordinary practice and the image of the Czech Republic as a good complier, since we believe that a detailed examination of such unusual cases has a particularly high potential to identify factors contributing to compliance difficulties. 62 As a counterfactual, 63 we added (iii) a case of full compliance -namely, the cluster of ECtHR judgments dealing with excessively lengthy proceedings -which posed a challenge to the Czech civil law and faced significant compliance hurdles but, despite these challenges, were eventually fully implemented. 64 This lengthy proceedings saga allowed us to distil the factors of compliance difficulties that control the false positives -if one of the factors appears both in full compliance cases and in cases with compliance difficulties, it is not a likely cause of compliance difficulties.
All three rulings were high-cost rulings that faced domestic opposition. In addition, none of the three studied cases was a stand-alone isolated case of human rights violation. Both the restitution laws and the lengthy proceedings were challenged by several applicants and addressed by numerous decisions of the respective international human rights organs throughout a longer period of time. Also the D.H. case clearly pointed out the existence of a structural issue. Although only one judgment of the Strasbourg Court has been issued so far, it concerned 18 applicants arguing widespread discriminatory practices in the elementary education system. Hence, the D.H. judgment also concerned a cluster of cases. Moreover, other cases of Roma children were pending before the Czech courts at that time. In other words, all three rulings were high-cost rulings that required a legislative change, all of them addressed a repetitive issue that resulted in a cluster of cases, all of them potentially affected many applicants at different stages of domestic litigation and all of them faced domestic opposition.
Our inquiry includes both the ECtHR's and the HRC's decisions. From the point of view of an ideal research design, it might have been more appropriate to focus only on the ECtHR rulings and choose a non-complied judgment of the Strasbourg Court instead of a non-complied view of the HRC. Such a case of overt non-compliance with a Strasbourg judgment, however, does not exist in the Czech Republic. Thus, we decided to include the HRC restitution case. On the one hand, it complicates the inquiry as it brings in the differences between the two regimes (most importantly, the legal status of the decisions and the design of supervisory mechanisms). On the other hand, the inclusion of the HRC case adds a new dimension to the domestic compliance mechanisms. It allows us to trace whether the domestic attitudes towards the ruling were affected by the features of the given international regime and to theorize about the significance of the features of the international decisions for their (non-)implementation. Moreover, we do not lump the three cases together without acknowledging the differences between the UN and the Strasbourg human rights regimes.
In evaluating the level of compliance with an international decision, we relied on the assessment of the respective international human rights regime in order to minimize our own subjective judgments about the level of compliance. 65 In the ECHR system, we considered judgments as fully complied if the Committee of Ministers (CoM) had adopted a final resolution expressing satisfaction with the measures taken by the respondent state and decided to close the examination of the case. In the HRC context, we considered the views to be fully compliant if the Committee classified the state's follow-up reply as satisfactory.
Determinants of Compliance Difficulties in the Czech Republic
Before discussing the particular cases, it is necessary to briefly introduce the status of international human rights law in the Czech legal order. According to the Czech Constitution, international human rights treaties enjoy application priority over ordinary legislation. 66 However, the Czech Constitutional Court (CCC) de facto 65 Therefore, we do not engage in the debates whether the ECtHR and the HRC potentially made their assessments on inadequate or opaque information, which could be contested by other actors. 66 constitutionalized international human rights treaties, and, thus, they serve as a benchmark for the constitutional review of legislation. 67 Regarding the decisions of IHRBs, the CCC has held that complying with the ECtHR's judgment against the Czech Republic is a constitutional duty 68 and that public authorities are obliged to take into account the ECtHR case law even if it concerns other states. 69 The HRC's views are seen by the judiciary as legally non-binding. 70 Only recently, the CCC has specified that, though not legally binding, the HRC's views provide reliable interpretation by the authority established by states to strengthen rights protection and, thus, have to be taken into account.
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In regard to the implementation of IHRBs' rulings, the Government Agent for representation of the Czech Republic before the ECtHR plays an important role. The Government Agent operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice and represents the state before the ECtHR as well as before the UN human rights treaty bodies. Apart from defending the state before these IHRBs, he plays the crucial role in the domestic implementation of the Strasbourg judgments and all decisions of UN human rights treaty bodies based on individual petitions. 72 While the Government Agent and his office are not equipped with powers to change the domestic policies themselves, they play an important coordinating and expertise-providing role as they formulatetogether with the relevant authorities -conceptions of necessary individual and general measures of non-repetition and propose the strategy and timetable leading to their adoption.
73 Domestic authorities are under a statutory obligation to cooperate and to implement the necessary individual and general measures. Now we can move to the analysis of the three earlier-mentioned high-cost rulings. We start with the case of non-compliance, followed by the case of significant compliance delays, and we finish with the case of full compliance. 
A Non-Compliance: Restitution of Property and the Condition of Citizenship
Restitution in the Czech context encompasses the return of property taken by both the Nazi and communist regimes from its original owners. The key constitutional litigation in the Czech Republic concerned Law no. 87/1991 on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation (LER), and, hence, we will focus primarily on this statute. 75 Initially, the LER stipulated two key limiting conditions for restitution: (i) citizenship of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) and (ii) permanent residence in the territory of the CSFR. 76 These two conditions de facto excluded from restitution persons who emigrated from Czechoslovakia between 1948 and 1989 because these emigrants either lost their Czechoslovak citizenship as a result of adopting the citizenship of another country or no longer had a permanent residence in Czechoslovakia due to their emigration. This design of the LER was a deeply political choice, which was adopted after a heated parliamentary debate.
After the division of Czechoslovakia, a group of Czech members of parliament immediately challenged the second condition (permanent residence) before the newly established CCC and won. 77 Energized by this victory, the individual applicants sought to have the second condition struck down as well. However, the CCC rejected this challenge and upheld the citizenship requirement. 78 In the meantime, both conditions were challenged before the HRC, which eventually concluded that not only the permanent residence requirement, 79 but also the citizenship requirement, violates the principle of equality guaranteed by Article 26 of the ICCPR. 80 More specifically, it opined that 'the State party itself is responsible for the departure' of the property owner and concluded that 'the continued practice of non-restitution to non-citizens of the Czech Republic has had effects' on the children 'that violate their rights under Article 26 of the Covenant'. 81 Later on, the HRC reaffirmed this stance 82 and even broadened its conclusions so as to also cover restitution to persons whose property was confiscated between 1945 and 1948 -that is, before the communist coup d'état. 83 However, the Czech Republic has refused to comply with these rulings. In fact, the reaction of all key domestic stakeholders was rather chilly. The government has not 75 it has also considered the restitution decisions of the HRC to be poorly argued, 85 and argued that the HRC's rulings are not legally binding anyway. 86 It also used the CCC's judgments 87 and the Strasbourg case law as a sort of shield against the HRC. 88 More specifically, the ECtHR held that Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 only protects 'existing possessions' 89 or 'assets ... in respect of which an applicant can argue that he has at least a 'legitimate expectation' that they will be realized'. 90 Hence, a 'long-extinguished' property right cannot be revived within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1. 91 The fact that the ECtHR held in favour of the Czech Republic in similar cases increased the legitimacy of the Czech government's 'anti-HRC' position domestically, 92 as the Czech government portrayed the situation as the requirement to follow either the ECtHR, the rulings of which are binding, or the HRC, the rulings of which are not legally binding.
93
The HRC's decisions also found virtually no support among the major political parties and key political figures. By opening up the possibility 94 that the Czech Republic could be forced also to return confiscated property to Sudeten Germans, 95 the HRC opened a proverbial Pandora's box of historical injustices and alienated the public 84 See, e.g., Decision of the Czech Government no. The HRC thus found itself in a difficult position. The only bearers of the pro-compliance flag were the applicants negatively affected by the citizenship requirement and the foreign associations of Czech compatriots, 101 who were occasionally supported by the US government. 102 This coalition was loose and weak. Moreover, it was run primarily from abroad, and its ideas had found little traction among the Czech NGOs or among other actors located in the Czech Republic. On the contrary, the HRC faced a strong anti-compliance bloc of virtually all governmental institutions backed by the CCC and popular sentiment. This bloc had been fairly stable since the 1990s, and, thus, even the moderate proposals by the Government Agent to ensure at least minimalist compliance in the mid-2000s had failed. As a result, the HRC's decision in Adam has not been complied with so far, 103 and it is unlikely that it ever will be, despite additional HRC restitution decisions against the Czech Republic, repeated criticism in periodic reports and various formal and informal meetings between the HRC and the representatives of the Czech government.
The fate of the HRC's restitution rulings in the Czech Republic also shows that when an IHRB touches upon a sensitive issue of transitional justice even the CCC, a generally pro-human rights body, is willing to 'creatively' reinterpret the HRC's decision so as to 96 Bobek and Kosař, supra note 66, at 178. 97 completely declaw it. In fact, the dealings with the past after the Velvet Revolution, which led to the adoption of specific lustration laws, 104 restitution laws 105 and the equalizing of Slovak pensions by the CCC, 106 has arguably become a part of the Czech constitutional identity and, as such, is vigorously defended by the Czech actors against any external interference that could alter the specific Czech narrative of its transition to democracy. Moreover, the HRC's views have touched upon the citizenship requirement, which raises the identity stakes even further. 107 Therefore, a broader lesson from the HRC's challenge to the Czech restitution laws is that it is particularly hard to find domestic support for the implementation of international human rights rulings if such rulings impinge upon the constitutional identity.
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B Compliance Delays: Segregation in Elementary Education
The case of D.H. and Others is the most politically and publicly controversial Strasbourg judgment against the Czech Republic. The case concerns the applications of 18 Roma children who challenged their enrolment in the so-called special schools intended for pupils with learning disabilities whose graduates had fewer possibilities in higher education. The seven-member chamber of the ECtHR decided in a six-to-one judgment that there had been no violation of the right to education (Article 2 of Protocol no. 1) or of the right not to be discriminated against (Article 14 of the ECHR). 109 However, the Grand Chamber came to a different conclusion. Even though it admitted that they may not be entirely reliable, the ECtHR took into account the statistics implying that the number of Roma children in special schools is disproportionately high. That gave rise to a suspicion of indirect discrimination, and the Strasbourg Court reversed the burden of proof. According to the Grand Chamber, the government had failed to meet the burden of proof as it did not prove that the high proportion of Roma children in special schools resulted from objective and non-discriminatory factors. The Grand Chamber was not satisfied with the arguments of the government. It stated that the tests used to assess children's abilities are potentially biased and that they do not take into account the specifics of the Roma population. Second, the Court held that the parents' consent to the placement of their children in the special schools had not been fully informed. These two shortcomings, among other things, contributed to the poor education of Roma children, which eventually hampered their future prospects of a high quality life. For all of these reasons, the Grand Chamber decided the Czech Republic had violated the applicants' right not to be discriminated against in conjunction with the right to education. 110 The Czech Republic has faced the challenge of complying with the decision since then under the enhanced supervision of the CoM 111 and under pressure from the Nordic countries. 112 Only in the proceedings before the CoM did it become clear what changes the implementation of the judgment actually required and how far it was necessary to go in reforming the Czech educational system. The 'guidelines' for the implementation of the judgment provided by the CoM not only pointed out the necessity of reforming the enrolment tests and the parental consent standard, but also stated that the system should generally move towards greater inclusion in mainstream education. 113 The domestic reactions to the Grand Chamber's judgment have varied profoundly. The advocates of inclusive education praised the judgment and thought of it as a promise of future change in the Czech Republic's system of primary education. Many other actors, on the contrary, heavily criticized the judgment and tried to advocate for the persisting system of the special schools. Even prior to the Grand Chamber's judgment, the Parliament had adopted a new School Act, which abolished the category of special schools. 114 But most of the former special schools were just given a new label of 'practical schools' and kept following the curriculum for children with mild mental disabilities, and the problem persisted. 115 The subsequent strategy to achieve more inclusive education was formulated in the National Action Plan of Inclusive Education.
116 Yet this plan was not put into practice in its entirety especially due to the politics of the new minister of education who did not prioritize the issue of inclusive education. 117 Therefore, many of the legislative plans were postponed, and only changes on the level of secondary legislation were made. 118 The implementation of this judgment has been hampered by the existing strong coalition of domestic stakeholders opposing compliance and defending the status quo. This broad coalition encompasses some of the parents of both Roma and non-Roma children and some of the headmasters and teachers of ordinary and practical schools. NGOs, 119 the Ombudsman and the Czech Human Rights Commissioner are on the other side of the spectrum as they argue for equal access to education and inclusive forms of education. 120 However, none of these pro-compliance actors possesses sufficient formal powers and the political capacity to push through the systemic change against the existing opposition. The impact of the domestic judiciary after the D.H. judgment was limited because there have been only a few cases initiated by the affected Roma children and their parents. 122 In addition, the EU has also stepped in. As a part of the EU's anti-discrimination policy, the European Commission has adopted the Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies, and the elimination of school segregation is one of its priorities. 123 In reaction to the slow progress in implementing the strategy, the European Parliament has urged the Commission to take a 'strong action' in cases of violations of the fundamental rights of Roma in member states. 124 128 These amendments, inter alia, guarantee auxiliary measures to every pupil with special educational needs and a compulsory year of kindergarten for children from the age of five. In the end, these reforms were adopted by the Parliament, although they faced significant opposition from certain members of parliament, the president and the tabloid media who strongly disagreed with the idea of inclusive education. 129 A major factor was the support of the new minister of education, Kateřina Valachová, who not only continuously advocated for the inclusion-oriented reform but also tried to reframe this reform. She patiently downplayed the alleged 'radicalness' 130 of the reform and kept explaining that the new model of inclusive education does not only help socially excluded kids (such as Roma children) but also kids with light mental and physical disabilities (including children of the Czech majority population). NGOs welcomed the newly introduced measures, but they emphasized their concern about the implementation of these measures in practice and about their financing. 131 Thus, after a long and complicated domestic battle, enriched by the inputs from the international level, some important legislative reforms leading closer to compliance were adopted. However, changes on the ground -namely, the ratio of Roma children in practical schools -have been rather limited, and the supervision process concerning the D.H. judgment has been still pending, even 10 years after the Grand Chamber judgment. The implementation of the D.H. judgment thus shows that even the ECtHR's judgment faces significant compliance difficulties, if it challenges deeply entrenched constitutional sentiments, 132 namely cultural homogeneity, repugnance of social engineering and apathy to socio-cultural inequalities that result in an aversion to anti-discrimination laws. 133 Most importantly, even though the state authorities have adopted several compliance-ensuring documents on the central level, they could not change the mindset of the headmasters and teachers of the practical schools whose practices are deeply entrenched and who therefore vigorously defend the status quo. Unfortunately for the ECtHR, this anti-compliance camp managed to persuade the significant portion of the Czech majority population that inclusive education harms their children.
C Full Compliance: Lengthy Proceedings
The largest proportion of the ECtHR judgments against the Czech Republic have concerned the violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time. 134 L'ubomír Majerčík refers to the lengthy proceeding cases as 'the most pressing issue' since they make up approximately 40 per cent of cases against the Czech Republic at the ECtHR. 135 In these judgments, the Strasbourg Court found the existing preventive mechanisms ineffective and the existing compensatory measures insufficient because the State Liability Act did not allow non-pecuniary damages to be awarded. 136 In the implementation efforts, 137 the Czech Ministry of Justice first prepared a legislative amendment introducing a mechanism of complaints to prevent excessively long proceedings. 138 The bigger step was the introduction of a new compensatory measure. The Ministry of Justice prepared a bill amending the State Liability Act. 139 According to the amendment, failure to decide a case in a reasonable amount of time constitutes maladministration for which the litigant may seek damages, including non-pecuniary damages. The amendment states that compensation for non-pecuniary damage does not depend on there being pecuniary damage, and it lays down criteria for the determination of the amount of just satisfaction to be awarded, which is clearly inspired by the Strasbourg case law. 140 The bill was eventually adopted in 2006. The context of adopting the amendment to the State Liability Act shows that the introduction of the new compensatory measure was not absolutely straightforward though. The new measure went beyond the existing concept of the scope of damages in Czech civil law and had important budgetary and institutional implications. The pre-existing civil law concept of damages in the Czech Republic would traditionally encompass, with the exception of certain standardized cases, only pecuniary damage. 141 The proposed compensatory measure, however, also introduced the liability of the state for non-pecuniary damage and thus introduced a significant novelty. In institutional terms, the amendment brought a new agenda both to the administrative bodies and to courts.
This novelty met mostly with doctrinal opposition from some of the major legal figures in the country, including academics and civil servants. Some of the political figures were not adamant supporters of the new measure either. For example, the then minister of justice was reluctant to support such a novelty, even though he did not openly oppose it. On the other hand, there was no principal domestic political opposition against complying with the lengthy proceeding judgments of the ECtHR. 142 The issue of slowly delivered justice had been salient even before the Strasbourg judgments. The CCC, the parliamentary political parties 143 and civil society articulated the issue of lengthy proceedings and called for redress. Nevertheless, it was the case law of the ECtHR that triggered concrete reforms, particularly the compensatory mechanism.
Despite this opposition, which was predominantly doctrinal, the governmentinformed by the dozens of cases lost in Strasbourg and supported by a strong procompliance coalition -proposed a bill introducing the new compensatory measure. It took a while before the Czech Parliament voted on it, 144 but once the new minister of justice came to power and replaced the former hesitant minister, the anti-compliance camp lost its only ally with any real political capacity to delay or block the change. The new minister of justice, Pavel Němec, reframed the issue, downplayed the corruption potential of the broader applicability of non-pecuniary damages and sidelined the key civil servants within the Ministry of Justice who opposed the change. He relentlessly pushed the bill through, and the Parliament eventually approved it by a great majority.
However, adopting legislation is not always enough. The implementation of the new compensatory mechanism in daily practice was facilitated by the stable support of key domestic actors. The Government Agent played a crucial role as it provided advice and expertise on the relevant ECHR issues. He prepared a detailed manual for application of the new compensatory measure. 145 The manual provided thorough information to the administrative bodies and the judiciary about the criteria for assessing lengthy proceedings and the amount of damages to be awarded when applying the new mechanism. 146 The judiciary, which reviewed the decisions of the Ministry of Justice on compensation for lengthy proceedings, was another key player. Most importantly, the Supreme Court's specialized chamber that was designated for deciding disputes concerning the state's liability for damages abandoned some of its conclusions made with respect to the older wording of the State Liability Act and adopted an approach inspired by the ECtHR's case law.
147 Acknowledging all of the domestic 142 Such an attitude cannot be taken for granted, though, as the German experience shows. Some of the German authorities believed in the efficiency of the domestic judiciary and claimed there was no need to make changes. Donald and Leach, supra note 46, at 290. 143 See the respective manifestos of parliamentary parties at that time. 144 This is another sign that implementation of these Strasbourg rulings was not as straightforward as it seems at first sight. 145 developments, both the Strasbourg Court and the CoM expressed satisfaction with the implementation of the compensatory measure for lengthy judicial proceedings.
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To summarize the lengthy proceedings saga, the ECtHR triggered the adoption of the new preventive and compensatory measures regarding lengthy proceedings, although the compensatory measure introduced significant novelties to the Czech legal order. The key turning point for full compliance was the appointment of the new minister of justice, who joined the pro-compliance camp, reframed the issue and downplayed the corruption potential of the new legislation. In contrast to the previous two examples of compliance difficulties, the following factors were largely missing in the lengthy proceedings saga: a strong anti-compliance camp, difficulties in reframing the issue in a way that would be more palatable for the key actors and long periods of inaction. Moreover, the hesitant individual (the minister of justice) and anti-compliance persons (civil servants at the Ministry of Justice) at the key ministry were quickly replaced or sidelined. Finally, the very issue being implemented did not touch upon constitutional identity or involve constitutional sentiments.
D Distilling the Sources of Compliance Difficulties
The three sets of analysed IHRB rulings show that implementation of high-cost rulings does not take place automatically even in a country that is generally depicted as 'a good complier'. 149 There is always a strong gravitational pull in favour of the status quo, and it requires a mobilization of significant energy, resources, and willingness to overcome it. So what explains the fact that some high-cost rulings are eventually implemented and some are not and why does it sometimes take ages to do so? We will explore this question by comparing the three cases studied above. We may trace certain similarities as well as differences among them. In all three cases, the relevant international human rights ruling raised the salience of a given human rights issue, and, in each case, there were always certain actors that pushed for implementation. At the same time, the implementation process in each of these cases was non-linear. Moreover, in all three cases, there was a turnover of key ministers, but it helped to steer the course in favour of implementation only in two cases -the lengthy proceedings saga and the D.H. case.
However, there were also important differences. There were periods of inaction in all three cases, but, in contrast to the D.H. case and the restitution rulings, the period of time was relatively short in the lengthy proceedings saga. Similarly, the anti-compliance bloc in the restitution cases and in the D.H. case was always strong, stable and vocal, 150 whereas, in the lengthy proceedings saga, it lost ground relatively quickly, and the support of the key actors waxed and waned over time. In the lengthy proceedings saga, the strong pro-compliance actors continuously pushed for implementation.
In the D.H. case, there was a dedicated pro-compliance coalition, which consisted of NGOs, the Ombudsman and the Czech Human Rights Commissioner, but it took a long time to bring the minister of education, who has the real political power, on board. In contrast, the pro-compliance camp in the restitution cases has always consisted of a loose alliance of weak actors.
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The other subtle difference between the D.H. case and the restitution cases, on the one hand, and the lengthy proceedings saga, on the other, is the domestic framing of the issue or the potential for domestic reframing. There was arguably no way to reframe the state citizenship condition in the restitution cases so that the implementation of the HRC's views would become politically more palatable to the Czech public. This factor proved extremely difficult in the D.H. case as well. Even though the Minister of Education Valachová took pains to explain at every occasion that the new model of inclusive education would not aim primarily at improving the education of Roma children but, rather, would help all children with disabilities, the tabloids, teachers and significant segments of the Czech population did not accept that narrative. In contrast, the lengthy proceedings saga offered this potential. Minister of Justice Němec dismissed the arguments about the potential negative repercussions of broadening the scope of non-pecuniary damages as being speculative and, instead, appealed to the efficiency and speediness of judicial proceedings, the value of which is highly praised across the Czech political spectrum.
To make things even more complicated, international pressure and unanticipated external shocks had also played a varying role. In the lengthy proceedings saga, the ECtHR's judgments were persuasive and well embedded in the previous Strasbourg case law.
152 Moreover, the ECtHR kept putting pressure on the Czech Republic by confirming new case law both against the Czech Republic and against other states. In contrast, both the HRC's views in the restitution cases and the ECtHR's Grand Chamber judgment in D.H. were novel, perhaps even surprising, 153 and had only limited support in the previous decision-making practice of both bodies. The HRC's views in the restitution cases as well as the ECtHR's D.H. judgment were initially also considered to be poorly argued. 154 In the D.H. case, the strong dissenting opinions did not help implementation either as they provided arguments for the anti-compliance camp. 155 156 By doing so, it has increased the pressure on the Czech government. In contrast, the HRC has not issued similar decisions against other states and has failed to improve its reasoning in its 'restitution rulings'.
Moreover, the pressure of the supervisory bodies varied as well. While the HRC's practice in follow-up procedures has been the most developed among the UN treaty bodies, 157 it has not exercised any significant pressure on the Czech Republic due to a lack of resources. In contrast, the CoM has increased its scrutiny especially in the D.H. case, which was upgraded to an enhanced supervision mode. 158 It has exercised a constant and intense pressure on the Czech government to adopt new implementation measures. Due to the regular meetings of the CoM, the Czech Republic has repeatedly faced the question of implementation of the D.H. judgment. This issue has been put on the table again and again, backed, in particular, by the Nordic states and influential and dedicated international NGOs, which has been an additional incentive for the dynamics of the domestic compliance process and has contributed to steps towards compliance. 159 Finally, the D.H. case also appealed to other constituencies beyond the Strasbourg system. 160 Notably, the Nordic countries and their representatives have criticized the Czech government for not implementing the D.H. case properly, both at the CoM meetings as well as at other diplomatic fora. 161 In this endeavour, the Nordic countries have joined forces with Amnesty International and other international NGOs.
162 Perhaps even more importantly, the European Commission has further increased pressure on the Czech Republic to implement the D.H. judgment since it has initiated the infringement procedure against the Czech Republic under the Racial Equality Directive, using the shortcomings of the Czech Republic that were exposed by the D.H. judgment as a major argument. 163 Some domestic pro-compliance actors have even claimed that the threat of initiating infringement procedures has given them more domestic leverage than the enhanced supervision reviews by the CoM. 164 In contrast, the HRC has not managed to engage the EU nor other signatory parties to the ICCPR in the implementation of its 'restitution views' against the Czech Republic.
In other words, the international reputational costs of non-compliance have been much higher in the D.H. case than in the restitution cases. While this difference is partly caused by the differences in powers of the relevant supervisory bodies and the lower normative force of the HRC's views, this is not the whole truth. The pressure from the EU and the Nordic countries, as well as the subsequent Strasbourg rulings on indirect discrimination of Roma children against other signatory parties, has been instrumental in raising the international reputational costs in the D.H. case. Conversely, the inability of the HRC to engage the European Commission in the restitution cases during the Czech accession process, 165 as well as HRC's failure to develop its 'restitution case law' against other states, has contributed to the low international reputational costs of non-compliance with the HRC's views on the Czech restitution laws.
Apart from domestic politics and international pressure, there is one more element in the implementation process that can make the difference, even though it is seemingly unrelated to the given human rights issue. Sometimes unexpected external shocks may reduce or increase domestic political costs of compliance with international human rights rulings. Recall that the key legislation for implementing the D.H. case was adopted in 2015 and 2016. This was actually the peak of the EU migration crisis that overshadowed any other human rights issue, both among politicians and the media. In comparison to the refugee resettlement quotas imposed by the EU, the requirements of the D.H. judgment seemed all of a sudden to be relatively meek and less salient. 166 To put it bluntly, the threat of a flow of migrants became the main target of criticism, not the educational changes helping the Roma community. In such an environment, the issue of inclusive education became relatively easier to push through the Czech Parliament. The EU migration crisis thus helped to create a 'window of opportunity' for adopting inclusive education laws, which would have otherwise been difficult to sell to the members of parliament due to the high salience of the issue and the potential retaliation of a significant portion of the Czech electorate. Minister of Education Valachová fully exploited this unique opportunity and pushed these bills through the Parliament successfully.
Some of the factors mentioned in this article have already been discussed in the compliance literature. It is known that the domestic 'battle' over compliance 167 is inseparable from an international human rights ruling, 168 from the subsequent input of 165 The principle of the rule of law and prohibition of discrimination were discussed in the accession reports at length. The HRC thus missed the opportunity to team up with the European Commission and exercise the synergic pressure on the Czech Republic to comply with the HRC's views on the Czech restitution laws. 166 The Visegrad countries (including the Czech Republic), supported by the polls, significantly resisted the quota. 167 international human rights bodies during the follow-up procedures 169 and from the actions of other supranational actors. 170 We also know that an international human rights ruling can shift the domestic discourse and strengthen the bargaining position of certain domestic actors. 171 More specifically, it can provide the political coverage for human rights reform or even lead to popular mobilization demanding compliance. 172 By doing so, it can help to overcome domestic opposition 173 and tip the balance in favour of implementation. 174 However, IHRBs can achieve this goal only if they find the support of domestic and transnational interlocutors. 175 In other words, the strength and mindset of the pro-compliance camp as well as of the anti-compliance coalition matter.
Our contribution to the existing compliance literature is the identification of additional factors that affect the compliance process -the possibility of reframing the human rights issue that is being complied with, the synergic effects with the EU and external shocks. These factors have not been sufficiently discussed in the compliance scholarship. Yet they have played an important role in the three sets of judgments against the Czech Republic and, to a large extent, explain the emergence of compliance difficulties. While the cumulative effect of the synergy with the EU and the external shock provided an implementation boost in the D.H. case, the difficulty in reframing the D.H. case has hampered full implementation since the very beginning. In a similar vein, the impossibility of reframing the citizenship requirement in restitution laws, the low international reputational costs due to the uniqueness of the transitional setting and the non-binding status of the HRC's views, the lack of synergy with the EU and no relevant external shock have helped us explain non-compliance with the the HRC's restitution rulings. Moreover, these new factors might be the proverbial missing pieces in the compliance puzzle. If we add them to the puzzle, a clearer picture starts to emerge. We sketch this picture in the next section of this article.
Towards a Theory of Compliance Difficulties
The previous section has illustrated the dynamics of compliance mechanisms in the Czech Republic and identified the factors affecting the emergence of compliance difficulties in high-cost rulings. This section will analyse how these factors have operated together and led to a variable level of implementation. Although we believe these factors can be generalized beyond the Czech case, it is necessary to consider the limitations of this case study research. First, it is extremely difficult to make definite causal claims in such a complex endeavour since the implementation of high-cost rulings of the IHRBs require the action of many stakeholders. Second, with respect to country selection, our conclusions are likely to be restricted to other liberal democracies with developed institutional capacities.
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While we find it difficult to single out the factors that account for variable implementation, we believe that there is a clear pattern in how these factors operate together within the compliance process. Our study shows that the level of compliance achieved depends on a repeated balancing exercise, in which domestic political actors balance domestic political costs of compliance, on the one hand, with the international reputational costs of non-compliance, on the other. 177 Importantly, this balancing exercise is repeated as it is conducted not only immediately after the ruling of IHRB is rendered but also at later stages when the political actors receive a sufficiently strong impulse. As will be shown below, the political costs of compliance as well as the reputational costs of non-compliance may change over time, each of them in both directions, which may alter the result of the balancing exercise. Sometimes, even a short moment of time when the domestic political costs of compliance become lower than the international reputational costs of non-compliance may create a 'window of opportunity' for adopting legislation that is necessary for implementing the high-cost ruling.
The simple logic of this balancing exercise is as follows: the higher the domestic political costs and the lower the reputational costs are, the more likely compliance difficulties occur. On the contrary, cases that are distinguished by low domestic political costs and high international reputational costs tend to lead to full and timely compliance, at least in the case of a liberal democracy with well-developed institutional capacities. We understand the domestic political costs of compliance to be the costs of overcoming domestic opposition. General measures implementing international human rights rulings change the status quo, and there will always be some actors opposing the change. The domestic perception of the issue addressed by the international decision then affects what kind of actors and opposition will be involved in the compliance process.
If the issue can be framed so that it is perceived domestically as being technical (like the lengthy proceedings in the Czech Republic), it is not likely that the ruling will attract the attention of strong political actors. Thus, the opposition will rather be doctrinal and/or technocratic. In such cases, the political costs of overcoming the opposition and implementing the required policy change are rather low. At the other end of the spectrum are cases with extremely high political costs of policy change. Those cases touch upon issues concerning the constitutional identity of the given polity (like the restitutions, which arguably became a part of the Czech constitutional identity). They are very likely to produce fierce opposition in strong political actors. As a result, the political costs of eventual policy change in such cases are extremely high. Similarly, cases touching upon constitutional sentiments (such as the D.H. case) likely produce considerable opposition in the political actors, which implies high political costs for policy change.
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There are few ways to weaken the domestic political opposition, but most of them are not available immediately after the international human rights ruling is rendered. Perhaps the only measure that can be employed from the outset is reframing.
179 If the pro-compliance actors manage to give the issue a different 'spin', which makes the change more palatable, they may weaken or even disintegrate the anti-compliance camp and, thus, reduce the political costs of overcoming domestic opposition. However, even reframing is sometimes not an option as some issues are almost impossible (such as the state citizenship condition in the Czech restitution cases) or difficult (such as reducing the number of Roma children in practical schools) to reframe.
On the other end of the balancing scale are the international reputational costs of non-compliance. In general, third states rarely intervene directly in the implementation of an IHRB's ruling in a non-complying state. 180 However, if the international human rights ruling addresses a structural issue that is also present in other signatory states and this issue is particularly dear to the third states (such as Nordic states in the D.H. case) and other international actors (such as the EU and international NGOs in D.H.), the international reputational costs are no longer negligible and may alter the result of the balancing exercise. However, as mentioned above, this balancing exercise is not static. In fact, the lapse of time is an important intervening factor in the compliance process. As time passes, the domestic political costs, as well as the international reputational costs, may change. These changes may create 'windows of opportunity' for implementing the international human rights ruling. This may happen when either initial domestic political costs decrease or when initial international reputational costs increase (or both phenomena occur at the same time) to such an extent that it alters the result of the balancing exercise in favour of compliance.
First of all, the lapse of time can bring about inputs that may rearrange the domestic political costs of compliance. The clearest one is the change of electoral preferences of the people and the respective governmental alteration. However, sometimes even the change of a key minister can make the difference. 181 Another possible input 178 Supra note 132. 179 The other measures (discussed below) such as wearing the anti-compliance camp out, altering the government or changing the attitudes of the public require more time. External shocks cannot be, by their very nature, triggered internally. 180 Supra note 55. 181 opportunity' for implementing the high-cost rulings can be quite short, and they thus must be ready to act when such a window opens.
Conclusion
Compliance difficulties pose a major challenge to the effective and legitimate functioning of IHRBs. Building on the compliance processes in the Czech Republic, this article has aimed to explain under what conditions compliance difficulties occur in well-complying liberal democracies and what factors contribute to their overcoming these difficulties. We have argued that compliance difficulties emerge as a result of the domestic battle over compliance, which is fuelled by the internal characteristics of the given international human rights ruling and the subsequent inputs by IHRBs and other international actors. However, we went deeper and showed that the fate of compliance difficulties is also affected by other understudied factors such as the possibility of, and the eventual success in, reframing the given human rights issue, synergic effects with the EU and external shocks.
We have also identified a recurring pattern that explains the occurrence of compliance difficulties and their inability to overcome these difficulties -the level of compliance achieved depends on a repeated balancing exercise, in which domestic political actors balance the domestic political costs of compliance with the international reputational costs of non-compliance. The higher the domestic political costs and the lower the international reputational costs are, the more likely compliance difficulties occur. On the contrary, cases with low domestic political costs and high international reputational costs tend to lead to full and timely compliance.
Importantly, such balancing is exercised repeatedly as the lapse of time can bring additional incentives, which may alter the domestic political costs as well as international reputational costs. This ongoing dynamics implies that compliance difficulties can be overcome at later stages of the implementation process, but only if domestic political costs of compliance become lower than the international reputational costs of non-compliance. We call this moment a 'window of opportunity'. Our study shows that pro-compliance actors have to take full advantage of such 'windows of opportunity' in order to overcome compliance difficulties and adopt measures necessary for complying with the rulings of IHRBs. If they fail to do so, this window of opportunity may close for a long time, if not forever.
